COMMENTS
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION IN FEDERAL
LEGISLATION: HARMONIZATION
WITHIN THE STATUTORY
SCHEME
The past five years have witnessed a drastic change in the Supreme
Court's attitude toward the doctrine of implied rights of action. In a
series of decisions, the Court has imposed severe restrictions on the
availability of implied private causes of action under federal statutes.'
The Court is not only increasingly reluctant to find additional implied
private actions, but is also determined to restrict the scope of existing
implied rights of action. An important aspect of this restrictive attitude
is the Court's policy that implied actions must be harmonized with
those causes of action expressly provided by the federal act. The harmonization policy reflects the Court's concern that the effectiveness of
procedural and substantive requirements included in the express cause

of action will be circumvented if plaintiffs are permitted to employ an
implied cause of action with more relaxed requirements. Thus, even
when an implied private action is deemed necessary to effectuate the

legislative purpose, courts must first consider the impact the implied
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD (1968), hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERO;
Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critiqueand Evaluationof Its Impact Upon the Scheme
of the FederalSecurities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977), hereinafter cited as Cox.
1. The Court's new attitude of restraint in the implication of remedies is one aspect of a
larger policy of limiting access to the federal courts. See McMahon & Rodos, JudicialImplication
of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167, 177 (1976);
Note, Implied PrivateActions UnderFederalStatutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine,
18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429,446 (1976). The Supreme Court has, for example, used the standing
doctrine to deny judicial remedies to parties seeking to enforce their rights through the federal
courts. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974). Similarly, the Court has limited access to the federal courts through the
doctrine of justiciability. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Note, supra,at 446-47. Implicit
in the Court's position is a willingness to accept as adequate existing administrative and criminal
statutory enforcement and to withhold statutory remedies even though an injured plaintiff might
be left without a right of action. See notes 20-21 infra. The Court has also denied an implied
private right of action when the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically of state concern. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See text accompanying note
23 infra.
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action will have upon those rights of action expressly included in the
statutory scheme.
Lower courts traditionally have been free to formulate their own
approaches to determine the proper relationship between express and

implied rights of action. These different lower court approaches must,
however, be reevaluated in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions. This Comment will examine the Court's restrictive policy toward implied rights of action and suggest its likely effect on the various
approaches to reconciling express and implied rights of action. The

Comment will also suggest a preferred approach for harmonization and
will -address unresolved issues concerning its implementation.
I.

A.

THE CHANGING LAW OF IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

The Development of a Restrictive Attitude Toward Implied Rights
of Action.

1. The LiberalApproach Toward Implying Private Rights of Action. The implication of a private cause of action has long been recognized as a means of effectuating the overall goals of a statute.2 The
Supreme Court first invoked the doctrine of implied remedies in Texas
andPacfic Railway v. Rigsby,3 holding that an injured railroad worker
had an implied right of action to sue his employer for damages under
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 4 In the fifty years following Rigsby,
2. The doctrine of implied rights of action has been traced to an English case, Couch v.
Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1041, 1045 (1960). See also Thayer, Public Wrong and PrivateAction, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317
(1914). The implied action doctrine was traditionally based on the tort theory of iiferring negligence actions from statutory standards of conduct. Comment, PrivateRemedies Under the Consumer FraudActs: The JudicialApproaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 413, 430 n.85 (1972); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). The
Supreme Court, however, has indicated in recent decisions that the implication of private actions
under federal law is a matter of statutory construction. Thus, courts are to determine whether
Congress intended to create an implied action. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979); see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1975). See notes 16-25 infra and accompanying text.
The doctrine of implied private actions has been justified as necessary to effectuate the purposes of legislation. Courts are arguably in the best position to ensure the effectiveness of remedial legislation and thus have been viewed as coordinate lawmakers with the legislature. Note,
Implying CivilRemediesfrom FederalRegulatoryStatutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963); see Note,
Emerging StandardsForImplied Remedies Under FederalStatutes, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 294, 296
(1976).
3. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
4. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 11-15 (1976). The Rigsby Court found that Congress passed the Safety
Appliance Act to protect railroad employees. The Court stated the standard for implying a civil
action as follows: "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default is implied .... " 241 U.S. at 39.
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courts found implied private rights of action in a number of federal
5

statutes.

In the 1960s the Supreme Court in JZ Case Co. v. Borak6 and
Wyandotte TransportationCo. v. United States7 formulated a liberal set

of standards for finding implied rights of action. Under these standards, the courts were merely to inquire whether the existing liability

provisions were adequate to effectuate the congressional purpose.8 Following this liberal approach, courts frequently found implied rights of
action even though the particular plaintiffs could not have sued successfully under the statute itself.9
Closely related to the question whether an implied private right of
action exists is the issue of the proper scope of that private action once
it has been recognized. Courts frequently must decide whether to extend a previously found cause of action into subsequent cases involving
different classes of plaintiffs or different circumstances. Generally, as

courts expanded the number of implied rights of action, they also expanded the scope of the private actions that already had been implied.

The most prominent example of this expansion was the implied right of
action for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
5. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (right of action implied under
Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976)); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (right of
action implied under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1976)), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1045 (1972); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (migrant workers who accepted employment through employment system established by the WagnerPeyser Act of 1933, 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976), held entitled to civil remedies for violations of the Act);
Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (private right of action for
racial discrimination implied under section 1374(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 484(b), 622(a), 676 (1976)); Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind.
1976) (implied right of action under Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976));
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implied remedy under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)).
6. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the Court found an implied right of action under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) makes the
use of false or misleading proxy statements illegal.
7. 389 U.S. 191 (1967). In Wyandotte, the Court stated that the criminal sanction of section
15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), which proscribes the negligent
sinking of a ship in a navigable waterway, was not the exclusive remedy under the statute. The
Court held that the United States could bring a civil action to recover from the owner the costs of
removing the vessel.
8. In Borak, the Court emphasized the Exchange Act's broad remedial purposes, finding
private enforcement to be "necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." 377 U.S. at
433. In Wyandotte, the Court clarified the essential factors in determining whether to imply a
private right of action: (1) whether the interests of the plaintiff were within the class protected by
the statute; (2) whether the harm that had occurred was of the type the statute was intended to
prevent; and (3) whether criminal liability was adequate to ensure the effective enforcement of the
statute. 389 U.S. at 202.
9. See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
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193410 and rule lOb-5, t" promulgated under that section. Section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, which prohibit the use of any manipulative device or
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, were
first held to give rise to an implied cause of action in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co. 12 In Kardon, the court found an implied private action
under rule lOb-5 for material misrepresentations that induce the sale of
securities. In the years following Kardon, federal courts expanded the
scope of the implied action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to allow
suits in a wide variety of situations.' 3 This expansion permitted suits
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The Act provides:
§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.

11.

Id.
12. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-57 (1972) (private
action implied under rule lOb-5 for injury caused by misrepresentation of material fact; the plaintiff was not required to show that he relied on those facts); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971) (right of action implied under rule lOb-5 for scheme to
purchase shares with ultimately worthless assets); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (private rule lOb-5 action for insider, tipper, and tippee
use of nonpublic material information); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (rule
1Ob-5 violated by material misrepresentations regarding promissory notes, even if defendant unaware that statements were false); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 66061 (7th Cir. 1973) (shareholders of corporation purchasing car-leasing business with newly issued
stock may sue under rule lOb-5, even though not purchasers or sellers of stock), cert. denied,416
U.S. 960 (1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.) (private action for
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in written press release), cert. denied,404 U.S.
1004 (1971); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (private right of action under rule lOb-5
for corporate mismanagement--corporate directors' sale of corporation's stock to themselves).
The decisions in White v. Abrams and Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. are now
questionable in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975), and Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 737 (1975), respectively. See notes 35-48 infra and accompanying
text.
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by many plaintiffs who otherwise would have been prevented from
bringing actions under any of the express liability provisions 4 of the
5
securities laws.1

2. Recent Limitations on FindingImplied PrivateRights ofAction.
Since 1975 the Burger Court's decisions have indicated a retreat from
the liberal attitude of the Borak-Wyandotte era and a more restrictive

approach toward implied rights of action. For example, in National
RailroadPassengerCor v. NationalAssociationofRailroadPassengers
(Amtrak), 16 the Court refused to recognize a private right of action
under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.17 In deciding whether to
find a private right of action, the Amtrak Court did not look solely to
the harm the statute was intended to prevent or to the adequacy of

existing remedies. Rather, the Court emphasized the necessity of determining whether Congress specifically intended to grant a private right
of action to persons in the particular circumstances of the plaintiffs. To
ascertain Congress's intent, the Court invoked the restrictive maxim of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,t8 and inter-

preted a section of the Amtrak Act providing for enforcement by the
Attorney General as a sign of congressional intent to preclude all other

remedies. The Court also found support for its conclusion in the legis-

lative history and the purpose of the Rail Passenger Service Act.' 9

14. There are three express liability provisions in the Securities Act of 1933: section I I,15
U.S.C. § 77k (1976), which provides a remedy for persons buying a security when a registration
statement is misleading on the date it becomes effective; section 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(I) (1976),
which provides a remedy when the sale of securities is not registered but should be; and section
12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), which permits an action where securities are purchased on the
basis of a misleading representation. See A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT oF RULE lOb-5 § 3.01 (rev. ed.
1979). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also provides three clear express liability provisions:
section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976), confers a private right of action against a party who has
willfully engaged in market manipulation; section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), permits an
issuer to bring an action for disgorgement of all insiders' short swing profits; and section 18(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), provides a private right of action to investors who have been defrauded by
relying on documents filed with the SEC.
15. See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
16. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-650 (1976). The Act prohibited discontinuance of passenger trains prior
to January 1, 1975 unless the railroad had entered into a contract with Amtrak under which Amtrak would take over the railroad's responsibility for intercity passenger rail service. Section 307
of the Act provides for enforcement suits by the Attorney General or, in cases involving a labor
agreement, by employees or their representatives. Id § 547.
18. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
19. According to the Court, the expressio unius maxim would yield to clear evidence of contrary legislative intent. The Court, however, found evidence in the legislative history of an intent
to deny private actions other than those specifically authorized by the Act. 414 U.S. at 461. Although the Court concluded that implication would be contrary to the legislative intent, it also
considered whether an implied private action would be consistent with the legislative purpose.
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In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has continued to apply
the implication doctrine restrictively. 20 The Court has consistently ignored the question of whether an injured plaintiff has an adequate remedy under a statute and instead continues to stress the necessity of
divining congressional intent at the time of enactment. 21 This concern
for Congress's intent is central to the Supreme Court's first comprehensive implication test, formulated in Cort v. Ash. 22 In that case the
Court listed four factors to be considered in determining whether to
imply a private right of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"

that is, does the statute create a federal

right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one?. . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?.
. . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
to infer a cause of action based solely on
would be inappropriate
23
federal law?

Although the Con test breaks down into four criteria, it is essentially a three-part inquiry, insofar as the Court saw the first two criteria
Again relying on the legislative history, the Court found that the purpose of the Act was to preserve passenger train service and noted that one method of achieving the Act's purpose was the
quick and efficient elimination of unprofitable routes. According to the Court, allowing private
actions to enjoin proposed discontinuances would impede the process to be used in the paring of
unprofitable routes. Id. at 463.
20. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (expressio unius
invoked to deny implied private action under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied
private action under section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976));
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (no implied private action under Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976)); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412 (1975) (Amtrak followed; Court reluctant to imply private action since section 7(b) of
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1976), provided administrative
remedy).
21. In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975), the Court found
no indication of congressional intent to permit an implied right of action under the Securities
Investor Protection Act. The Court thus denied plaintiffs an implied private action even though it
meant that the only remedy under the Act was that the Securities and Exchange Commission
could sue in federal court. Similarly, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court found no
evidence of a legislative intent to permit a private right of action under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970) (repealed 1976). The statute prohibited the use of corporate funds in federal political campaigns. The holding in Cori left only criminal sanctions under the Act, and potential state law
claims.
22. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
23. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
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merely as reliable indicators of Congress's intentions. 24 The inclusion
of the second criterion in Cort reaffirms the Court's insistence on using
legislative history to determine legislative intent. Therefore, a finding
that Congress intended to deny a private cause of action disposes of the

implication question.2 5 In its decisions since Cort v.Ash, the Supreme
Court has placed almost total reliance on discerning the legislative in-

tent as manifested in the statutory language and in the statute's legislative history. 26 The Court has only occasionally utilized the four24. The four-pronged Cori test's only significant addition to the standards used in Amtrak is
thus the state concern factor. See Comment, mplying PrivateCauses afActionfram FederalSlatutes: Cort and Amtrak Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 53, 62 (1975).
25. 422 U.S. at 82-83. Most lower court decisions applying the Cart test have denied private
rights of action. E.g., Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977) (no cause of action
implied under criminal statute dealing with transportation and labeling of goods made in prisons,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1761, 1762 (1976)); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976)
(no implied action under section 601 and other provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1421 (1976)); Jaillet v. Hill & Hill, 460 F. Supp. 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (no implied action
under section 202(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a) (1976));
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (no implied action under section 503
of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976)). Nevertheless, the Cort test also has been
used to imply private remedies. E.g., Leist v. Simplot, No. 79-7402 (2d Cir., July 8, 1980) (Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-19 (1976)); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir.
1978) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1906, 33 U.S.C. § 401 1976)); Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)), cert. denied,436 U.S. 913 (1978); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1933, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
26. See Leist v. Simplot, No. 79-7402, slip op. at 4092 (2d Cir., July 8, 1980) (Friendly, J.)
(the Supreme Court's recent decisions indicate that congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" in implying causes of action from federal statutes). There are strong indications that the
majority of the Supreme Court no longer considers the Cort standards restrictive enough. In
several recent decisions, the Court has returned to its more restrictive Amtrak approach, placing
total emphasis on discerning the legislative intent, as manifested in the statutory language and in
the legislative history. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Cf.Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1478
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (Cort test permits implication too readily; courts should not condone implication "absent the most compelling evidence the Congress in fact intended such an action to exist").
Although the TransamericaCourt found that section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), gave rise to a limited implied remedy, the Court reached this
conclusion only because the statutory language implied that a limited right of action was intended.
444 U.S. at 18-19. In Redingion, the Court denied an implied right of action under section 17(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), discerning no evidence of a legislative intent to permit such an action in the statutory language or in the legislative history of
section 17(a). Transamerica and Redingtan also marked the resurrection of the expressio unius
rule, which the Court had not invoked since before Cart v. Ash. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. In Transamerica,the Court relied on the maxim in denying an implied cause of action
under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 444 U.S. at 19-20. In Redington, the
Court used the maxim as support for its decision denying an implied private action under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Transamericaalso makes apparent a second indication of the Court's increasing restrictiveness. The Court found a limited implied right of action,
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27
pronged test of Cort v. Ash.
Recently the Court indicated that before finding an implied private right of action from a federal statute it will also consider the likely
impact of an implied private action upon the statutory scheme. In
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,28 the Court held that section 17(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 29 which requires broker-dealers and
others to keep such records and file such reports as the Securities and
Exchange Commission may prescribe, does not create a private cause
of action. The principal basis for the Court's holding was the absence
of any language in section 17(a) indicating that Congress intended to
create private rights of action.30 The Court also justified its holding,
however, by examining section 17(a) within the statutory scheme of the
securities laws. Noting that section 17(a) is flanked by provisions of the
31
Securities Exchange Act that expressly grant private causes of action,
the Court found, through what amounted to the use of the expressio
unius rule, that the existence of these express remedies militated against
implication. 3 2 The Court also reasoned that to permit a plaintiff to pro-

restricting available relief to contract recission, injunctive relief or restitution. Id. at 18-20. Just
the previous term, in Davis v. Passman,442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court had recognized that "the
question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and prior to the question
of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive." Id. at 239.
27. The Court is adopting a very pragmatic, nonuniform approach. In essence, it uses
whatever process of reasoning is necessary to achieve the desired result. See Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under The FederalSecuritiesLaws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J.
891 (1977). In Transamerica,the Court never mentioned the Cort test, while in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court relied exclusively on the Cort standards in
reaching what was virtually a foregone conclusion. In Cannon, the Court inferred a right of action
under section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1976). The language in Title IX is very similar to the language in section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976), from which the Court had previously inferred a private
remedy in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1969). Instead of overruling
Allen, the Cannon Court utilized a straight Cort analysis and inferred a cause of action from Title
IX. 441 U.S. at 689-90.
One may also hypothesize that to a great extent the Court's recent decisions depend upon
who is the writer of the opinion. When an opinion is written by a justice opposed to implied
actions, having a different starting point in the first draft stage, there often results slightly different
language than if the opinion is drafted by a proponent of implied rights of action.
28. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
30. 442 U.S. at 568-69. According to the Court, section 17(a) was designed to provide protection for brokers' customers and did not require that a private damage action be implied on their
behalf. Id. at 578-79.
31. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); section 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); section
9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
32. 442 U.S. at 571-72. The Court invoked the reasoning it used in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975): "When Congress wished to provide a damage
remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly." 442 U.S. at 572. See notes 35-42 infra and
accompanying text.
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ceed under section 17(a) would disrupt the statutory scheme. Section
18(a) of the Exchange Act, for example, expressly creates a private
cause of action against persons making materially misleading statements in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 33
Protection under section 18(a), however, extends only to persons who,
in reliance on the statements, purchased or sold a security at a price
that was influenced by the statements. In Redington there was no allegation that the injured party had purchased or sold securities in reliance on the section 17(a) reports. The Court found that to permit a
section 17(a) action would nullify the requirements for a section 18(a)
suit.

34

3. Recent Restrictions on the Scope of Previously Recognized Implied Rights of Action. Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has
also adopted a restrictive attitude toward the extension of previously
recognized implied rights of action. For example, the Court has placed
significant limitations upon the scope of the implied right of action
under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. In Blue Chio Stamps v. ManorDrug
Stores,3 5 the Court upheld the rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,36 which limits standing under the section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
implied right of action to persons who have been defrauded in connection with their own purchase or sale of securities. 37 In reaching its decision, the Court observed that Congress had rejected a proposed
amendment to section 10(b) to change its wording from "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" to "in connection with the
purchase or sale of or any attempt to purchase or sell any security. '38
The Court regarded this modicum of legislative history as evidence that
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
34. According to the Court: "[W]here the principal express civil remedy for misstatements in
reports [section 18] . . .is by its terms limited to purchasers and sellers of securities, we are extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in § 17(a) that is significantly broader than the remedy
that Congress chose to provide." 442 U.S. at 574.
The Court also took note of evidence in the legislative history that section 18(a) was intended
to be an exclusive remedy for misstatements filed with the SEC, though it did not decide the
question. Id.
35. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Blue Cho, a nonpurchasing offeree of Blue Chip Stamp Company Securities brought suit under section 10(b) and rule lob-5. The prospectus containing the
offer of Blue Chip stock was pessimistic in its appraisal of the offeror's status and of future prospects. The plaintiff alleged that the prospectus was materially misleading and designed to discourage the plaintiff and other offerees from buying the shares at a bargain price. The plaintiff also
alleged that the offeror was able, as a result, to sell the securities to the general public at a higher

price.
36. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1957).
37. 421 U.S. at 754-55.
38. Id. at 732 (citing 103 CONG. REc. 11636 (1957)) (emphasis added by the Court).
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Congress intended to limit the benefits of the section 10(b) implied pri39
vate right of action to actual purchasers and sellers.

The Court in Blue Chp Stamps also looked, however, to the statutory scheme, noting that the express liability provisions of the 1934 Act
and of the Securities Act of 1933 were limited to purchasers and sellers
40
of securities and were enacted contemporaneously with section 10(b).

From this limitation the Court reasoned that Congress could not have
intended to create a broader class of plaintiffs in an implied cause of
action than it had created under the express liability sections. 4 ' Under

Blue Chip Stamps, therefore, the purpose and the scope of the express
used in establishing the contours of the
liability sections were criteria
42
implied right of action.

Less than a year after Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court
decided Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.43 Again, the Court imposed a
substantial limitation on the scope of the implied right of action under

section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, stressing that the implied remedy must not
nullify the purpose and effectiveness of the express liability provisions.44 The Court held that a section 10(b) action would reach only
willful and knowing acts and not negligent misstatements or omissions. 45 As in Blue Chip Stamps, the Court based its decision partly on

its interpretation of Congress's intent in passing section

10(b). 4

6

Never-

theless, a second important basis for the Court's holding in Hochfelder
39. 421 U.S. at 733.
40. Securities Act of 1933, section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil liability for false registration statements); section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) (civil liability arising in connection with prospectuses and communications). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i
(1976) (civil liability for manipulation of security prices); section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976) (civil
liability for false or misleading statements in documents filed with the SEC).
41. 421 U.S. at 736.
42. The Court also rested its decision on policy considerations. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
43. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44. In Hochfelder,an investor who had utilized the services of a brokerage firm sought damages from Ernst & Ernst, the firm's public accountant, in a civil action for negligence brought
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The plaintiff alleged that Ernst & Ernst had failed to discover
a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by the brokerage firm's president.
45. 425 U.S. at 214. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
had held that a breach of a duty of inquiry and disclosure would result in liability for damages for
aiding a third party's violation of rule lOb-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or prevented
but for the breach. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). The other courts
of appeals were divided on the issue. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
required more than mere negligence, while the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits reached the contrary conclusion. See Cox 569-70.
46. The Court found that the use of the words "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances" indicated Congress's intent to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct "designed to
deceive or defraud investors." 425 U.S. at 199. The Court also concluded that the legislative
history of section 10(b) contained no indications of congressional intent to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter. Id. at 202. See also Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
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was its belief that the scheme of the federal securities laws would be
seriously disrupted if courts interpreted section 10(b) to reach negligent

acts. Plaintiffs suing under provisions expressly imposing liability for
negligence must satisfy certain procedural limitations. Since an im-

plied action under section 10(b) imposed none of these limitations, 47
the Court concluded that the use of a negligence standard in section
10(b) actions would effectively negate the procedural restrictions pres48
ent in the other provisions.
The Court has used various processes of reasoning in limiting the

scope of implied causes of action. In virtually all of its decisions, 49 it
has engaged in a close analysis of the statutory language and the legis47. Sections 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) and 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976) of the Securities
Act of 1933 expressly impose liability for negligence in the sale or offering of securities. Several
procedural restrictions in the express liability sections are generally not duplicated in the section
10(b) implied private action. For example, the statute of limitations for actions brought under
sections I1 and 12 requires suit to be brought within one year of discovery of the wrong and under
no circumstances more than three years after the shares were offered to the public or after the sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). In actions brought under section 10(b) for the conduct prohibited by
sections 11 and 12, the courts of appeals have followed analogous state law, in accordance with
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). This has usually resulted in a longer statute of
limitations. See A. BROMBERG § 2.5(1). Sections 11 and 12(2) also permit courts to require that
plaintiffs suing under those sections post security for the defendant's expenses. This procedural
limitation has not been imposed on plaintiffs suing under the section 10(b) implied private action.
A. BROMBERG § 2.5(2). Finally, there are slight advantages in the venue provision applicable to
section 10(b) plaintiffs. Venue under section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933, which applies to
sections I1 and 12(2), lies where the defendant is found, resides or transacts business or where the
offer or sale took place. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976). Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), also permits venue in any district in which any act or transaction
constituting a violation occurred. Thus, if the misrepresentation occurs outside of the state where
the sale occurred, a section 10(b) action could be maintained either in the state of the misrepresentation or in the state where the sale occurred. Actions under sections II or 12, on the other hand,
would only be heard in the state of sale. See Cox 584.
48. The Court stated: "Such extension of [section 10 to include negligent conduct] would
allow causes of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2) and 15 [the provisions imposing liability for negligence] to be brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully
drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions." 425 U.S. at 210. The procedural requirements of section 10(b) as fashioned by the lower courts are, in many instances, considerably more
relaxed than are those restrictions included in the express liability provisions. See notes 84-89
infra and accompanying text.
49. Other Supreme Court decisions since 1975 have placed restrictions on the section 10(b)
implied action and on other private rights of action that previously had been implied. E.g., Santa
Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (no cause of action implied under section 10(b) and rule lob-5
for breach of corporate fiduciary duty not involving manipulation or deception); TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (requirement of materiality in rule 14a-9 implied action defined as requiring substantial likelihood that reasonable shareholder would consider misrepresentation or omission important in deciding how to vote).
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court declined to find a private cause of
action under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), for a
defeated tender offeror, although it reserved the question whether section 14(e) might permit an
implied action for corporate shareholders. 430 U.S. at 45.
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lative history.5 0 The Court has also used policy considerations 5l and
the Cort v. Ash tests.52 Finally, in Blue Chip Stamps and Hoch/elder,
the Court expressed concern about the impact that expansion of an implied right of action might have upon the effectiveness of the express
rights of action included within the statutory scheme. Thus, the con-

cern for statutory disruption evident in the Court's decision in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, in which the Court declined to find any implied private right of action, 53 is also present in decisions determining
the scope of existing implied rights of action.
B.

The Concernfor Harmonizationof Private Rights of Action Within
the Statutory Scheme.

As illustrated by the Supreme Court's decisions in Redington, Blue
Chip Stamps, and Hochfelder,54 a question concerning the likely impact of finding an implied cause of action upon the statutory scheme
may arise during the initial decision to imply a private right of action
and during subsequent inquiries about the scope of a previously recognized implied private action. Express liability provisions are often

carefully drawn to cover specific statutory violations and to impose specific substantive and procedural restrictions on would-be plaintiffs. For
example, section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,55 which
prohibits the filing of materially misleading reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, expressly permits private suits. The sec50. The Court thus has used essentially the same approach in defining the contours of the
implied actions as it has used in determining whether to imply a new right of action. See generally
Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming ofthe Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultivationofa New Securities
Law Perspective, 3 J. CORP. L. 112, 132-33 (1977).
51. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-39 (1975) (conclusion
that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 implied actions are limited to purchasers and sellers of securities
is reinforced by policy against vexatious litigation which might result from an expanded class of
plaintiffs). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855-57 (1975) (exclusion of cooperative housing shares
from definition of "securities" under securities laws based, in part, on policy considerations
against including speculative and insubstantial transactions within the securities acts).
52. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977), the Court relied on a Cort v. Ash
analysis to support its finding that defeated tender offerors have no standing to sue under section
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Court initially
reached its conclusion through an examination of the statutory language and legislative history.
In Santa Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477-79 (1977), the Court concluded that a section 10(b) plaintiff must show that the alleged breach of corporate fiduciary duty is manipulative. The Court
supported this conclusion by focusing on the state concern factor of the Corttest. Thus, the Court
found that it was appropriate to relegate to state law what was essentially a claim of corporate
mismanagement.
53. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
54. See text accompanying notes 31-34 & 40-48 supra.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
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tion imposes a relatively short statute of limitations 56 and grants the
district court discretion to require either party to pay the costs of the

suit, including reasonable attorney's fees. 57 Generally, courts have interpreted section 18(a) to require that plaintiffs asserting a cause of ac-

tion under that provision prove actual rather than constructive reliance
on the misstatements. 58 Moreover, section 18(a) expressly permits the
issuer of stock to raise a defense of good faith and lack of knowledge
59
that the statement was false or misleading.

Nevertheless, specific requirements of the express liability provisions are essentially nullified if plaintiffs may sue for the same statutory
violation under an implied right of action that is not subject to the barriers contained in the express provisions. 60 Such nullification causes

serious disruption of a carefully designed regulatory scheme since
plaintiffs will enjoy procedural or substantive advantages not intended

by Congress. Because courts have often found implied private rights of
action in statutes of potentially broad application, the possibility of
overlap between implied rights of action and generally narrower express liability provisions is always present. 6 1 Section 10(b), for example, is a general proscription against the use of any manipulative device

or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Misleading reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
have been held to constitute manipulative devices within the ambit of
section 10(b), thus creating an overlap between the implied right of action under section 10(b).and the express right of action under section
18(a). 62 Section 10(b) traditionally has been held to impose less stringent substantive 63 and procedural requirements 64 than section 18(a).
56. The section 18(a) express right of action is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in
section 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1976). That section limits actions to within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after the cause of action
accrued.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
58. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,395 U.S. 903 (1969).
See also A. JACOBS, supra note 14, § 3.02 [h].
"59. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
60. See notes 85-89 infra and accompanying text.
61. Each of the express liability provisions of the securities acts, for example, is drawn much
more narrowly than section 10(b)'s general proscription against manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. See note 14 supra.
62. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
2175 (1980); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999
(D.D.C. 1978); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Sciden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. II1. 1976).
63. The section 10(b) implied action has, for example, been held not to require that plaintiffs
show reliance. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), some courts also permitted
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Hence, a plaintiff who alleges misrepresentations in a document filed
with the Commission can avoid the more onerous requirements of the
express liability provision merely by suing under section 10(b).
Less serious disruption of the regulatory scheme may result, however, if plaintiffs have an implied right of action that imposes different
restrictions from those included in the express provision if those different restrictions are significant. In this situation there is little negative
impact on the effectiveness of restrictions included in the express provisions, especially when the implied action's requirements closely resemble the express restriction, or when they tend to effectuate the same
65
legislative policies.
Prior to the mid-1970s, implied private rights of action were often
found and subsequently expanded almost without limitation. 66 When
a court adopted a liberal attitude toward implied rights of action, it had
little concern for the potential impact that the increased availability of
implied private actions might have upon the effectiveness of express
liability provisions. 67 Consequently, plaintiffs were often able to bring
suit under an implied right of action and avoid the substantive or procedural requirements that Congress had included in the express liabilplaintiffs to sue under section 10(b) without proof of scienter. See note 45 supraand accompanying text.
64. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977),
contain no provision setting a statute of limitations or determining apportionment of attorney's
fees and costs. Courts have imposed state statutes of limitations on actions under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. A. BROMBERG § 2.5(1). See note 85 infra and accompanying text. The district
court's power to award attorney's fees, on the other hand, has been sharply circumscribed by
Supreme Court decisions. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975) (showing of "bad faith" required for award of attorney's fees to successful defendant in
absence of statutory authorization); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974), cited in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.30 (1975).
65. See text accompanying notes 147-68 infra.
66. The best example of this growth is the implied private action under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, which has been referred to as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Thus, the
implied action has been used to proscribe a wide variety of frauds in connection with securities
transactions. Similarly, a number of courts implied a right of action under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 as a parallel to the section 10(b) private action. See, e.g., Newman v. Prior,
518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973). One
commentator has criticized the use of the section 17(a) implied right of action as a mere "tagalong" section to 10(b). Hazen, A Look Beyond the PruningofRule 10b-5: ImpliedRemedies and
Section 17(a) ofthe SecuriiesAct of1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978). Traditionally, courts have
also taken a broad approach to implied remedies in connection with civil rights legislation such as
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)
(damage remedy for housing discrimination permitted under section 1982); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (injunctive relief for housing discrimination granted under section
1982); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-36 (1948) (implied action under section 1982 found to
prevent enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by the courts of the District of Columbia).
67. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
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While some lower courts attempted to limit this

bypassing of statutory requirements, many others viewed the implied
68
and express private actions as cumulative and permitted the practice.
During this period the Supreme Court did not rule on the proper
relationship between express and implied rights of action. The Court's
liberal attitude toward implied rights of action seemed, however, to
sanction attempts to circumvent restrictions included in the express liability provisions as long as the implied private action effectuated the
legislative purpose. 69 Furthermore, in SEC v. National Securities
Inc.,70 the Court stated in dictum that some overlap between express
and implied rights of action would be permissible even if the implied
71
action included more relaxed substantive or procedural requirements.
Under the more restrictive approach used in the Supreme Court's
recent cases, 72 the existence of express liability provisions in an act has
a significant impact both on the decision to recognize an implied right
of action and on the determination of the scope of the private actions
already implied. Thus, in Blue Cho Stamps, the Court limited the
scope of the section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 right of action to purchasers
and sellers of securities partly because the express liability provisions of
the securities acts were similarly limited.73 In Hochfelder, the Court
refused to extend the section 10(b) implied action to negligent conduct,
noting that the express provisions of the securities acts proscribing negligent misconduct contain strict procedural requirements that could be
negated if section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 gave rise to an implied action
for negligence. 74 Finally, the Court indicated in Reding/on that it
would not infer a private right of action from a statute if that inference
would allow a plaintiff to avoid the substantive requirements of an ex-

75
press liability provision in the same act.

68. See notes 81-83 infra and accompanying text.
69. The Supreme Court stressed that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to

effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Some lower courts interpreted this liberal attitude as permitting
avoidance of the restrictions included in the express liability provisions. See, e.g., Jordan Bldg.
Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 49-50 (7th Cir. 1968).
70. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). Discussing the interrelationship of sections 10(b) and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court noted in NationalSecurities that the "fact that there may
well become overlap [between the sections] is neither unusual nor unfortunate." 393 U.S. at 468.
Courts have interpreted this language as supporting overlap between implied and express rights of
action. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Marketing, 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006
n.15 (D.D.C. 1978).
71. 393 U.S. at 468.
72. See text accompanying notes 16-53 supra.
73. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.

Vol. 1980:928]

IMPLIED RIGHTS OFACTION

While the Supreme Court clearly has adopted a policy of harmonizing express and implied private rights of action, the Court has not
explicitly indicated the extent to which implied actions will otherwise
be allowed to disrupt the statutory scheme. The Court's decisions
could be interpreted as mandating a policy of nondisruption.76 On the
other hand, a policy of harmonizing the provisions in a federal statute
does not necessarily require that all disruption be avoided. 77 Given the
paucity of elaboration in the Court's decisions, the lower courts have
been left to formulate their own approaches to harmonization consistent with the Court's mandate that the effectiveness of the express liability provisions not be nullified.

II.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR HARMONIZING PRIVATE
RIGHTS OF ACTION WITH THE EXISTING STATUTORY
SCHEME

The lower courts traditionally have devised their own approaches
to determine the proper interrelationship of express and implied rights
of action. Four different approaches emerged from the lower court decisions that preceded the Supreme Court's adoption of a restrictive attitude toward implied remedies. 78 An examination of these approaches
in light of the Court's present restrictive policy indicates that at least
two can be reconciled with the Court's recent decisions. 79 The better
approach recognizes that limited disruption of the statutory scheme is
not necessarily inconsistent with a policy of harmonization. Courts
should permit limited overlap between implied and express rights of
action as long as the express liability provisions are not negated by al80
lowing alternate rights of action.
A.

Lower Court Approaches to InterrelatingActions in Light of the
New Law of Implication.

1. Free Overlap. The most liberal approach developed by lower
courts prior to 1975 permitted free overlap between implied and express rights of action. Under this approach, implied and express pri76. See text accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
77. Cox 585. The author suggests that equating harmony with a prohibition against all conflict between express and implied private actions fails to recognize that some overlapping between
the express and the implied causes of action may be consistent with the goals of the legislation.
Id. 602.
78. While the lower court decisions often vary in their precise rationales, their approaches
can be divided quite readily into four general categories. See notes 81-151 infra and accompanying text.
79. See text accompanying notes 123-25 & 159-61 infra.
80. See text accompanying notes 147-48 infra.
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vate actions were "cumulative and not mutually exclusive." 8' Implied

private rights of action thus were found and extended without regard
for the potential impact upon the effectiveness of express liability provisions. 82 The usual justification for permitting free overlap was that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. 83 When a court concluded that the legislative purpose was to
afford adequate remedies to injured plaintiffs, it was considered
counterproductive to duplicate those elements of the express liability
provisions that might deny an injured party relief.
The free overlap approach could be of tremendous advantage to
plaintiffs. 84 For example, in the case of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, a
plaintiff proceeding under the implied right of action could avoid the
following restrictions that exist under the express liability provisions:
(1) the generally shorter statute of limitations;85 (2) the requirements of
posting security for expenses; 86 (3) the more stringent privity requirements; 87 and (4) the more difficult requirements for proving market
manipulation through false reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 88 The relaxed requirements of section 10(b) and
81. Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1968).
82. Schaeffer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943
(1976); Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group,
Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Considerable overlap between implied and express rights of action occurred during the period of expansion of implied rights of action. See, e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108
(9th Cir. 1974) (implication depends on whether statute's protection would be enhanced by allowing overlapping private civil relief; cause of action inferred from section 302a of Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976)); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor &
Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) (plaintiff allowed to sue under rule lOb-5 although defendant's
alleged conduct fell squarely within section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77/
(1976), and section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976)).
83. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 49-50 (7th Cir. 1968). See
note 69 supra and accompanying text.
84. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
85. State statutes of limitation govern a rule lOb-5 implied action, see Charney v. Thomas,
372 F.2d 97, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1967); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951),
and are generally longer than the statutes of limitations expressly provided in the securities acts.
A. BROMBERG § 2.5(1).
86. Under the express liability provisions the district courts may assess court costs and attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff. A. BROMBERG § 2.5(2).
87. The privity between plaintiff and defendant necessary to maintain an action is fairly relaxed in the express liability provisions. For example, sections 12(2) and 15 of the Securities Act
of 1933 permit a buyer to recover from a seller (generously construed) or from anyone in control
of the seller. Traditionally, the privity requirement in a rule lOb-5 implied action was even more
relaxed, requiring only that the misconduct be "in connection with" the sale or purchase of a
security. A. BROMBERG § 2.5(3).
88. The proof requirements of a section 18(a) express right of action, for example, are much
more difficult to satisfy than those under rule lOb-5. Under section 18(a), a plaintiff must prove
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rule lOb-5 resulted in a proliferation of lawsuits under the implied right
of action, while the express liability provisions of the Securities Exchange Act fell into relative disuse. 89
Despite the Supreme Court's recent restrictive position toward im-

plied rights of action, some lower court decisions continue to treat implied and express remedies as cumulative. Several recent decisions
have limited the Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder analysis of the
proper scope of implied private actions to the specific statutory provisions involved in those cases.90 Thus, neither case is viewed as implicitly overruling decisions adhering to the free overlap approach.
This interpretation is contrary to the Court's statement in

Hochfelder that implied rights of action must not be extended so as to

"nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions
on . . . express actions." 9 1 Although the language in the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in SEC v. National Securities Inc.92 indicates
that overlap between remedies might be permissible, 93 Hochfelder, Blue

Cho Stamps, and Redington modify that language and require that the
contours of implied remedies be determined, in part, by cross reference
to the express liability provisions. 94 The Supreme Court's use of the
expressio unius rule to deny implied rights of action also seems to require reference to express provisions. 95 While it is unclear whether the
Court will apply the maxim in determining the interrelationship of priactual reliance on misleading documents filed with the SEC. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909,
916 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,395 U.S. 903 (1969). Hence, only "the diligent few who peruse
filed corporate reports" can bring an action under the section. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975). See A. BROMBERG § 2.5(4); III L. Loss, SECUaRIaS REGULAT"oN 1751-54 (2d ed. 1961). Under the rule lOb-5 implied action, in contrast, plaintiffs have, in
certain contexts, been relieved of the burden of proving reliance. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (no requirement of proving reliance in rule lOb-5 actions involving nondisclosure or a material misrepresentation). See generally Note, Reliance Requirement
in PrivateActions under SECRule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584 (1975) (lower courts are divided
about whether a presumption of reliance exists in all private actions under rule lOb-5). See note
63 supra.
89. See A. JACOBS, supra note 14, § 302U].
90. Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Marketing, 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006 n.15
(D.D.C. 1978); accord,Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 1, 9 (N.D. I. 1977); Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 684 (N.D.

1976).
Ill.
91. 425 U.S. at 102.
92. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
93. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
95. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). See notes 18 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
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vate rights of action, its use by the Court in deciding whether to imply
rights of action at all militates against free overlap. The continued validity of the free overlap approach thus is dubious in light of the
Supreme Court's concern for the statutory scheme of express and implied causes of action.
2. In Pan Materia. A second group of decisions attempted to
harmonize express and implied remedies by construing them in par!
materia.96 Under this approach, the implied right of action was construed to effectuate the legislative policy embodied in restrictions contained in any express liability provisions covering the same statutory
violation.9 7 A plaintiff injured by conduct proscribed by the express
provision might be permitted to sue under an implied right of action,
but he would be required to satisfy whatever substantive and procedural requirements the court deemed necessary to effectuate the legislative policy advanced by the express provision. 98 In Rosenberg v. Globe
Aircraft Corp.,99 for example, a district court imposed the venue requirements of sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 100 on an
implied action under section 10(b) based on a misleading prospectus.
Suits based on that particular violation of the Securities Act are expressly permitted in sections 11 and 12 of the Act. The court found that
the express procedural requirements included in sections 11 and 12 evidenced a congressional policy of imposing significant restrictions on
actions for particular types of statutory violations. The court reasoned
that an implied action covering conduct also proscribed by sections 11
and 12 must include the procedural restrictions which Congress chose
to include in those express liability provisions:
[Congress] in Secs. 11 and 12, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77k and 771, has prescribed what amounts to a code of procedure ....
Looking at [the
implied and express private actions] as one statute it is simply not
possible that Congress, having prescribed in elaborate detail procedural requirements which must be fulfilled in order to enforce civil
liability attaching to a carefully defined type of violation, would have
casually nullified them all in a later section.' 0 '
Construing statutory provisions inparimateriaavoids possible disruptions of the statutory scheme and revitalizes the express liability
96. Relating to the same subject matter, see United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940);
2A C. SANDS & A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03, at 298-99 (4th ed. 1973).
97. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5201, at 530 (1943).
98. Id. at 530-3 1.
99. 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976).
101. 80 F. Supp. at 124.
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03
provisions. 0 2 In Piter v. Chris-CraftIndustries,1
the Supreme Court

indicated that the inparimateria rule may be useful in identifying the
elements of implied rights of action.' 4 Pioer involved rule lOb-6,
which prohibits market tampering by issuers whose stock is in the process of distribution. Under the rule, issuers may not buy the stock or the
right to purchase the stock until the distribution has been completed.

The Court held that implied actions under rule lOb-6 require that the
alleged violations of rule lOb-6 actually have affected the price paid for

stock during the distribution. The Court supported its holding by comparing rule lOb-6 to section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act,105 which
creates an express remedy in favor of "any person who shall purchase

or sell any security at a price which was affected by [an unlawful market activity].'"106 Noting the close relationship between rule lOb-6 and
section 9, the Court reasoned that rule lOb-6 also requires that the manipulative activity have influenced the amount an investor paid for the
stock.' 0 7 Likewise, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
suggested that the implied private action in section 10(b) is to be construed inparimateria with sections 9 and 18 of the Securities Exchange
Act.'0 8 In concluding that section 10(b) only covers acts involving a
lack of good faith, the Hochfelder Court relied on the legislative history
of sections 9 and 18.109
Despite the Court's statements in Piter and Hochfelder that the
elements of implied rights of action may be identified by referring to
express liability provisions, the Court has never insisted that express
and implied private actions be interpreted inparimateria so as to limit
102. Construing actions in pari materia is much more restrictive than the free overlap approach and may reflect judicial concern for preventing disruption of the statutory scheme. See
Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948). But see Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969) (section 17(a) action should follow rule
lOb-5 actions because of identical language in each enactment; sections construed inparimateria),
cer. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).

103. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
104. Id.at 26. Piper involved an unsuccessful tender offer by Chris-Craft Industries in a contest against Bangor Punta Corporation and the existing management of Piper Aircraft Corporation for control of Piper. Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta each had acquired substantial blocks of
Piper shares before Bangor Punta ultimately secured control. Id. at 4-10.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
106. Id.(emphasis added).
107. 430 U.S. at 45-46.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1976). See 425 U.S. at 209 n.28.
109. 425 U.S. at 207-11. The Court thus found that the legislative history of section 18(a)
suggests that "something more than negligence on the part of the defendant is required for recovery" under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 211 n.3 1. Implicit in
this construction is the suggestion that section 10(b) is to be interpreted in pari materiawith sections 9 and 18. For the Exchange Act, the elements of section 10(b) would accordingly be determined by reference to the elements of the express liability provisions. See Cox 596.
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the scope of implied actions by the substantive and procedural requirements of the express liability provisions. The Court thus has not foreclosed the use of implied causes of action to avoid the restrictions of the
express actions. 10 Furthermore, there are a number of problems inherent in the in pari materia approach that militate against its use. First,
the in pari materia approach may misapprehend congressional intent
by assuming that no statutory disruption is tolerable. The existence
within the securities acts of overlapping express liability provisions
with different substantive requirements suggests that some statutory
disruption surely is acceptable to Congress."' Second, construing
rights of action in par!materia can present problems in selecting the
referent express provision when more than one provision proscribes the
same conduct. As one commentator has suggested, the inquiry into
which express provision should govern "will turn on the strength of the
analogy between the challenged conduct and that proscribed in an express liability section, over which differences of opinion will be most
pronounced."'1 2 Finally, interpreting rights of action in par mater/a
may create artificial results.' '3 Plaintiffs suing under an implied action
for particular conduct proscribed by an express liability section may be
required to meet the generally more strenuous requirements of the express provision. If the event that triggers the application of the express
liability section is not present, however, the plaintiff would be permitted to proceed under the more relaxed requirements of the implied
right of action, even though the conduct is essentially the same as that
proscribed by the express provision. For example, a plaintiff who sued
under section 10(b) after relying on a misleading report fied with the
Securities and Exchange Commission would be bound by the restrictions included in the relevant express provision, section 18(a), whereas
a plaintiff who relied on a misleading prospectus and who bought on
the open market would be subject only to the more relaxed requirements that have developed under section 10(b). The line drawn between these two classes of plaintiffs under the inparimateria approach
may often have little to do with the objectives of the statute." 4
3. Presumption of Exclusivity of an Express Right ofAction. Another restrictive approach taken by lower courts prior to 1975 was to
raise a presumption of exclusivity of an express liability provision.
110. See Cox 597.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.
Cox 598.
Id. 598-99.
Id. 599.
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Under this approach, the existence of an express right of action was
virtually conclusive evidence of a deliberate legislative intent to ex-

clude implied rights of action for the challenged conduct.11 5 Exclusivity thus

relied upon the expressio unius maxim of statutory

construction. 1 6 Implied rights of action under this approach were
viewed as catch-all provisions, applying only to conduct not proscribed
by the express liability provisions, unless there was convincing evidence
that Congress intended overlapping private actions."t 7 Convincing evidence of legislative intent to permit an implied action for particular

conduct is unlikely to exist, however. If Congress actually had considered the matter of private actions to the extent that it appeared in the
language or history of the statute, the statute itself probably would contain a declaration that a private action does or does not exist or may or

may not overlap with other rights of action.' 1 8 Therefore, the presumption raised by this approach is likely to be virtually irrebuttable. Plaintiffs alleging conduct proscribed by an express liability provision

would, in most instances, be limited to suing under that section, subject
to the section's substantive and procedural requirements.
Although the exclusivity approach significantly restricts the scope

of implied causes of action, the results under it do not greatly differ
from those obtained by construing implied and express rights of action
9 When the challenged conduct falls within the ambit
inparimateria."1
of an express liability section, plaintiffs under either approach are re-

quired to overcome barriers specifically set forth by Congress before
they can maintain an action. The exclusivity approach does, however,
avoid the necessity of forcing a court to choose between referent provisions if more than one exists. 120 Furthermore, the approach takes into

account the possibility of legislative intent to allow disruption,' 2 ' al115. See In re Penn Cent., 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (no implied right of action under
reporting requirements of section 13(a) of Securities Exchange Act; section 18(a) exclusive remedy), aff'd In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); accord, du Pont v. Wyly,
61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973). See also Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 561
F.2d 963, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (private right of action would not harmonize with congressional
intent as evidenced in statutory scheme of Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396(a), (g)
(Supp. 111978)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 690, 706 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (statutory scheme of Securities Act of 1933 evidence that no
implied action intended under section 17(a) of 1933 Act).
116. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
117. See In re Penn. Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528, 540-41 (3d Cir. 1974); Traylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
118. Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1412 (1975).
119. See notes 97 & 98 supra and accompanying text.
120. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
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though requiring convincing proof of such legislative intent to permit
of the exclusivity approach of little practical
overlap makes this aspect
22
assistance to plaintiffs.1
The Supreme Court's recent decisions provide some support for

the exclusivity approach. The Hochfelder Court's instruction that the
effectiveness of express actions not be nullified can be interpreted as

prohibiting disruption of the statutory scheme. 123 Moreover, the
Court's willingness to invoke expressio unius in recent decisions deny-

ing implication' 24 may mean that it will apply the rule to preclude
overlap between existing remedies. In response to the Court's restrictive attitude toward implied remedies, an increasing number of lower
courts have invoked expressio unius to deny plaintiffs a cause of action
under an implied action when the challenged conduct was proscribed
25
by an express liability provision.'

The recent Supreme Court decisions, however, can also be inter-

preted as rejecting an exclusivity approach. In Hochfelder the Court's
unwillingness to base its holding solely on its concern that the express
procedural requirement would otherwise be nullified indicates that the
Court will consider other factors in determining the proper interrelationship of private rights of action.126 In Blue Cho Stamps the Court
122. See notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note 48 supra.
124. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-20 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420 (1975); National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). See notes 18 & 26 supraand accompanying text.
125. See e.g., Keaukaha Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm., 588 F.2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1978) (statutory provision for public or very narrow private action raises rebuttable
presumption of no legislative intent to grant general private enforcement cause of action), cer.
denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1977) (no
implied remedy is provided under Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7426,
7428-7438, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976), given existence of both civil and criminal remedies
under the Act), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); Wenzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 464 F. Supp.
643 (E.D. Pa.), af§'d, 612 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1979) (specification of one remedy excludes another);
Berman v. Richford Indus., Inc. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,518 at 94,012 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (section 18(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), is exclusive
remedy for misstatements in reports filed with SEC); Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760 at 94,974-75 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (section
18(a) is exclusive); Jaillet v. Hill & Hill, 460 F. Supp. 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (no implied remedy
under section 202(a) of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)
(Supp. 11 1978); express remedy in section 505(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976), exclusive);
Kulchok v. Government Employees Ins. Co. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,002 (D.D.C. 1977) (section 18(a) exclusive); Sverha v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 1064
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (when statute creates rights and provides specific remedy, remedy is exclusive).
126. The Court found that the statutory language and legislative history indicated no congressional intent to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. 425 U.S. at 199-202. See note 46 supra
and accompanying text. See also Cox 585.
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stressed that the legislative scheme alone provided inadequate guidance

for ascertaining the proper contours of the section 10(b) implied right
of action.1 27 The Court noted that actual intent concerning the scope of
a judicially created private action cannot logically be attributed to Congress merely because a statutory scheme exists.' 28 The Court thus
looked to other factors in determining whether to extend the implied

private action under section 10(b) to nonpurchasers and nonsellers of
securities. 12 9 Recently, in Redington, the Court indicated that it will
examine a statute's legislative history to determine whether an express
liability section provides the exclusive remedy for the challenged conduct.' 30 It is clear, therefore, that the Court will not rule out the possi-

bility of an implied private action merely because the conduct falls
within the strictures of an express liability provision. Expressio unius is

merely to be used as a tool of statutory construction, not as a conclusive
index of legislative intent.' 3 ' The language in Hochfelder can also be
interpreted as tolerating limited disruption of the statutory scheme
when the effectiveness of the express liability provisions is unaffected.' 3 2 While the Court indicated that the effectiveness of the express sections must not be impaired, it did not state-and never has
33
stated-that all overlap between private actions must be avoided.'

Despite the increasing number of courts willing to prevent any
overlap, 34 raising a presumption in favor of exclusivity is a flawed approach. Expressio unius by itself is an unreliable index of congressional

127. 421 U.S. at 737.
128. Id.
129. See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
130. The Court noted in dictum that "[t]here is evidence [in the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] to support the view that § 18(a) was intended to provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements contained in any reports filed with the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission, including those filed pursuant to § 17(a)." 442 U.S. at 573-74.
131. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-22 (1979), the Court
relied on expressio unius and on the legislative history in denying an implied right of action under
section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Similarly, in Redingion, the Court used an expresslo unius argument merely as support in denying an implied right
of action. 442 U.S. at 571-72.
Although courts have used the expressio unius rule for many years, they have not agreed as to
its proper scope. They have used the rule to preclude implying causes of action when express
remedies have been provided. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra. The rule has also,
however, been used merely as a tool of statutory construction. See Comment, supranote 118, at
1412, 1415-19. Although the Supreme Court appeared to rely on expresslo unius in Amtrak, the
opinion can be interpreted as using the rule to support its view that an implied action would
interfere with the statutory purpose. Id. 1419. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 160-61 infra.
133. Id.
134. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
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intent and has been widely criticized.' 35 The rule assumes that Congress considered all possible rights of action and made a discriminating
choice as to which would be allowed. This premise "usually is unrealistic, for it assumes too much foresight in the draftsman."' 36 The provision of specific remedies may only reflect Congress's concern that
certain rights of action be assured. 37 Furthermore, carefully drawn
procedural requirements in the express liability provisions should not
automatically serve as a basis for denying implied rights of action for
the challenged conduct. The existence of particular requirements may
only suggest that any implied right of action for the same statutory violation must contain requirements as rigorous as those imposed by the
express liability section. Moreover, the statutory scheme in certain acts
implies that some disruption is acceptable. 138 Plaintiffs are often allowed, for instance, to bring actions under different express provisions
139
with different substantive requirements.
The presumption of exclusivity may also ignore the purpose of a
statute. This is illustrated in the case of implied rights of action under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.140 In Sierra Club v.Morton' 4' the
district court held that sections 9 and 10 of the Act gave rise to implied
rights of action. According to the court, Congress enacted those sections to prevent injuries to private parties as a result of obstructions to
navigation unauthorized by the United States.' 42 The court rejected
the claim that section 12,143 which makes violation of those sections a
135. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943); Potomac Passengers
Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rep'd sub nom. National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Matheson v.
Armburst, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961). See also Note,
Implying CivilRemedies, supra note 2, at 290-91 (1963). Until the Supreme Court's resurrection of
the expressio unius rule in Amtrak, it had not resorted to that rule of statutory construction since
its decision in Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
136. Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 719 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
137. See Cox 601.
138. For example, under the express liability provisions of the Securities Acts, a plaintiff may
sue for a misleading report either under section 9(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1976), or under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2)
(1976).
139. The statutory disruption which Congress has permitted in the case of sections 9(a)(4) and
12(2) may indicate that similar disruption between an implied and an express private action also
may be permissible, provided that significant hurdles face plaintiffs under both sections. See text
accompanying note 165 infra.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). For a discussion of recent litigation under this Act, see Comment, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Erosion of Adainistrative
Control by EnvironmentalSuits, 1980 DUKE L.J. 170.
141. 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modifledsub nom. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1979), cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3123 (U.S. 1980) (No. 79-1625). The Court recently
granted certiorariin Andrus's companion case. See Kern County Water Agency v. Sierra Club,
610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.granted,49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1502).
142. 400 F. Supp. at 623.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1976).
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misdemeanor and permits the Attorney General to seek an injunction
to remove structures erected in violation of sections 9 and 10, was the
exclusive remedy under the Act."44 While the Morton court acknowledged the lack of clear evidence of legislative intent contrary to exclusivity in sections 9 and 10,1 4 . it found that the Supreme Court's
decision in Wyandotte TransportationCo. v. UnitedStates 46 precluded
application of the expressio unius maxim to the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899. Had the court followed an exclusivity approach, as urged by
the Attorney General, it would have ignored the legislative purpose of

preventing injuries to private parties.
4. Limited Overlap. A fourth approach some courts developed
prior to the emergence of the Supreme Court's restrictive attitude was
to permit limited overlap of express and implied rights of action.
Under this approach, an implied action might be used to fill a perceived gap in the statutory scheme, by permitting plaintiffs who otherwise would be excluded by the requirements of the express liability
provisions to sue under the implied cause of action. Before permitting
overlap between an implied and express cause of action, however,
courts taking this approach would evaluate the overlap's effect on the

statutory scheme. Overlap would be permitted only when the implied
private action would not undermine the express liability provision by
allowing the plaintiffs to recover under the same facts, but with easier

procedural or s~ibstantive requirements. Courts using this approach
thus permitted a plaintiff to avoid the particular requirements of an
express liability provision when to proceed under the implied private
action would still require the plaintiff to overcome other significant

substantive and procedural hurdles.' 47 The existence of different barri144. 400 F. Supp. at 624-25.
145. Id. at 623 n.10.
146. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
147. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 884 (D. Mass. 1973) (implied action under
section 10(b) for misrepresentations in registration statement and prospectus is permitted although
section 11 of Securities Act of 1933 covers such conduct; more stringent procedural restrictions
under section 11 are balanced by requirement of section 10(b) that plaintiffshow fraud); Dorfman
v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1093-96 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (implied action found under
section 17(a) of 1933 Securities Act for misstatements despite express provision in section 12(2)
because stricter procedural requirements of section 12(2) are balanced by section 17(a) proof of
fraud requirement).
Implicit in the limited overlap approach is the view that free overlap would be overly disruptive of the legislative scheme. See Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. at 883-84. Courts have also
used this approach of carefully appraising the extent of the disruption resulting from overlap
when those express liability provisions in an act provide for administrative enforcement. See, e.g.,
Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(implication of rights of action should be approached with great care lest a carefully erected legislative scheme be skewed; private actions under Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 are contrary to
balanced framework of administrative enforcement), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
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ers under the implied right of action meant that often it would be ad-

vantageous or necessary for plaintiffs to sue under the express section,
thereby preventing plaintiffs from routinely bypassing the particular requirements of the express liability provisions by suing under an implied
right of action.
Courts permitting limited overlap have emphasized differences in
procedural requirements, burden of proof, measure of damages, and
elements of a prima facie case. 148 In Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,' 49 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit employed a

limited overlap approach to permit suit under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 even though section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933150 also prohibited the challenged conduct. The court allowed the action because
section 10(b) required the plaintiff to show fraud, a substantive requirement not present in section 11. Thus, although the plaintiff was able to
avoid the procedural requirements of section 11, he faced a significantly greater burden of proof under section 10(b).' 5 1
Many courts have continued to follow the limited overlap ap-

proach since the beginning of the Supreme Court's restrictive policy
toward implied remedies.'

52

In Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 153 the Court

148. See, e.g., Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978) (section 12(2) action requires
mere proof of negligent omissions, though statute of limitations for section 10(b) action is longer);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) (implied private action under section
17(a) of Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), contains scienter requirement; express
rights of action in contrast impose different substantive and procedural restrictions); Pearlstein v.
Justice Mortgage Investors, [1978-19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 5 96,760 at 94,974-75 (N.D. Tex.
1978) (scienter requirement of section 10(b) distinguishes that cause of action from those under
sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1089, 1093-96 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (implied action under section 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933 requiring proof of fraud distinguished from express action under section 12(2)).
149. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
151. 188 F.2d at 786. Section 11 subjects a plaintiff to a shorter statute of limitations than
section 10(b) and to a bonding requirement not present in the implied right of action. See notes
85-86 supra and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692-94 (1st Cir. 1978) (private action under
sections 10(b) of 1934 Act and 12(2) of 1933 Act compared; 10(b) requires scienter, 12(2) has
stricter procedural requirements); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir.
1977) (implied right of action under section 17(a) of 1933 Act requires scienter so as not to negate
procedural restrictions of sections 11 and 12(2) of 1933 Act); Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760 at 94,974-75 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (scienter requirement of section 10(b) action distinguishes it from sections 11 and 12(2) of 1933 Act); Piascik v.
Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780-81 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (although implied right
of action under section 90(a), Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976), would
duplicate an express remedy in Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (1976), implied remedy is necessary to effectuate congressional purpose of assuring equal educational opportunity).
153. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2175 (1980).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed its approach in Fischman,
finding an implied cause of action under section 10(b) for damages
caused by the filing of false and misleading information with the Securities and Exchange Commission, notwithstanding that section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act' 54 prohibited the same conduct. The Ross
court rejected the view that implied and express private actions may
coexist without restraint, noting the Supreme Court's recent concern for
preserving the statutory scheme.' 55 Permitting the plaintiff to sue
under section 10(b), however, would not nullify the terms of section
18(a). The court observed that while section 18(a) imposes much
stricter procedural requirements than section 10(b), plaintiffs proceeding under the latter section face a significantly greater burden of proof.
A plaintiff suing under section 10(b) must plead and prove that the
defendant acted with scienter in making a material misrepresentation
or omission. Under section 18(a), by comparison, a plaintiff is required
56
only to show reliance on the misstatement.
The Ross court reasoned that permitting suit under section 10(b)
furthered a fundamental securities law policy of protecting open market investors. 57 Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are the primary mechanisms of redress under the securities laws for open market investors.
According to the court:
To hold now, at this late date, that conduct is not proscribed by section 10(b) Merely because it is also subject to section 18 would effectively deprive open market investors who relied on misleading
market information of any remedy simply because the 58misinformation happened to be lodged in a form with the S.E.C.'
The Supreme Court's language in Blue Chp Stamps, Hochfelder,
and Redington 59 supports the Second Circuit's approach in Ross.
None of the Supreme Court cases discussed whether overlap between
express and implied remedies should be permitted. The language regarding harmonization in each decision 60 is significant, however, because it cautions that the effectiveness and the purpose of the
substantive and procedural restrictions of the express liability provisions should not be nullified. Limited disruption of the statutory
scheme that does not negate the express requirements of those sections
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
607 F.2d at 554.
Id. at 555-56. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
607 F.2d at 556.
Id.
See notes 28-48 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 31-34 & 40-48 supra and accompanying text.
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and is not inconsistent with the probable legislative intent would be
61
permissible.'

In short, the limited overlap approach is the preferable harmonizing method for several reasons. First, limited overlap is restrictive and

thus consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of implied remedies. Second, the approach implements the Court's insistence

that implied actions should not undermine the specific

requirements of the express liability provisions. 162 Third, limited overlap effectuates the probable legislative intent better than the other ap-

proaches. This is likely to be important in view of the Supreme Court's
emphasis on discerning legislative intent.

63

The limited overlap ap-

proach recognizes that some disruption may be consistent with Congress's intentions, considering that Congress sometimes expressly
creates overlap in the statutory scheme. 164 Moreover, the imposition of

significant burdens on plaintiffs suing under an implied cause of action
furthers the apparent congressional policy of preventing vexatious or
frivolous litigation by requiring plaintiffs to overcome significant barriers.' 65 As Professor Loss has noted, Congress included significant pro-

cedural restrictions in the express liability provisions of the securities
acts as a barrier to be overcome by plaintiffs seeking to sue under the
express private rights of action. 66 Limited overlap would effectuate

this policy by imposing significant restrictions on plaintiffs seeking to
sue for particular statutory violations.

67

Finally, the limited overlap

approach may be necessary to effectuate the overall goals of a particu161. Ultimately, the extent to which the Supreme Court will allow implied rights of action to
overlap with express actions is probably directly dependent upon the Court's theory for implying
private rights of action. Thus, if the Court's theory for implying private rights of action continues
to be based upon a presumed intention of Congress, the overlap may well be limited to finding
another presumed intention of Congress as to the extent of permissible overlap. If, on the other
hand, the Court were to shift back to the Borak rationale of determining what would best further
the legislative purpose, overlap would be permitted to best effectuate the legislative purpose and
presumably would be more extensive.
162. See notes 31-48 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 21-27 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
164. See text accompanying note I ll supra.
165. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). See note 51
supra.
166. III L. Loss, supra note 88, at 1780.
167. Professor Loss did express doubts whether courts should "attribute to Congress the rather
elaborate intention" that a plaintiff be permitted to avoid the procedural requirements of the express liability provisions "if he voluntarily elects to assume the burden of [proving scienter on an
issue." Id. 1786. The important inquiry, however, is not to determine what specific restrictions
Congress intended, but rather how difficult Congress intended suits for particular misconduct to
be. As Professor Loss notes, the fear of "strike suits" led Congress to amend section II(e) of the
Securities Act of 1933 to provide both for security and for the award of counsel fees. Id. 1837.
Equally stringent restrictions under an implied right of action would be consistent with the legislative intent of preventing vexatious litigation.
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lar federal act. For example, in Ross a refusal to allow overlap would
have hindered the fundamental securities law objective of protecting
168
open market investors.
B.

UnresolvedIssues in Implementing the Limited Overlap Approach.

Despite the appeal of the limited overlap approach, there are a
number of unresolved questions concerning its implementation. A
principal problem is that the approach does not provide standards to
determine what constitutes sufficiently stringent requirements under an
implied remedy to assure that restrictions included in the express liability provision will not be nullified. Without standards, the balancing of
substantive and procedural hurdles might often be arbitrary and lead to
nonuniform results, especially when there is little useful precedent.
Some courts might continue to impose less stringent requirements on
the implied rights of action, thus permitting plaintiffs to avoid restrictive express liability provisions. A second problem is that a limited
overlap scheme does not indicate how courts should determine the procedural and substantive requirements to be imposed on plaintiffs suing
under an implied private action. The problem becomes magnified
when courts must decide whether to impose additional restrictions on
an implied action previously found to be excessively disruptive of the
statutory scheme. 169 Finally, there may be some circumstances in
which the limited overlap approach may not even be used.
1. StandardsforDeterminingthe Adequacy of Restrictionson ImpliedPrivateActions. There are a number of possible standards which
courts could use to determine if the substantive or procedural requirements imposed on plaintiffs suing under an implied action are significant enough to warrant avoidance of the particular restrictions in the
express provision. One such standard would require that the restrictions imposed on plaintiffs suing under the implied private action be as
stringent as or more stringent than those included in the express liabil168. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
169. One element of the section 10(b) action that might excessively disrupt the statutory
scheme is the coupling of permissive causation requirements with a longer statute of limitations
than exists under the express liability provisions of the securities laws. One commentator has
suggested that this development may be contrary to the likely legislative objective of preventing a
defendant's misleading statement or manipulative conduct from establishing him as an insurer of
the enterprise's success. Cox 612-13. Professor Cox argues that the coupling of liberal causation
rules with short statutes of limitations in the express liability provisions is persuasive evidence of
this congressional objective. Id. 611-12. To prevent plaintiffs from frustrating the policy of the
carefully drawn express liability provisions, courts may thus be forced to choose between more
stringent causation rules or shorter statutes of limitations. See notes 174-75 infra and accompanying text.
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ity provision. Thus, when different substantive requirements are involved, courts would determine whether the burden of proving the
elements of the implied action is as great as the burden facing plaintiffs
under the express liability section. In Ross P.A.H Robins Co., 1 70 the
court relied in part on this type of analysis, finding that "the far more
difficult task [proof of scienter] which confronts a plaintiff seeking to
proceed under § 10(b) provides a rationale for dispensing with the reli1
ance requirement inherent in § 18."''
Nevertheless, permitting overlap solely on the basis of the rigorousness of hurdles facing plaintiffs under each right of action wrongly
assumes that the purpose of substantive and procedural requirements is
solely to restrict the ease with which plaintiffs may sue for a particular
statutory violation. This assumption ignores the fact that significant
qualitative differences between the elements of the private actions
alone may be sufficient to preserve the effectiveness of the express liability provisions. Plaintiffs unable to prove an element necessary for an
implied right of action, for example, have no alternative but to try to
proceed under the express private action. 72 The fact that the requirements of the implied action might be less burdensome on the plaintiffs
would not, under those circumstances, detract from the effectiveness of
the express liability section. In addition, the rigorousness standard
would be difficult to implement. Comparing the relative burdens facing plaintiffs under each right of action is largely a speculative exercise,
and could lead to arbitrary decisions allowing or disallowing the implied cause of action.
A second possible standard would be to permit suit under an implied private action whenever the implied action imposes substantive
requirements different from those imposed under the express liability
provisions. The addition of different elements may indicate that the
implied action addresses different problems arising out of the particular
federal act. Arguably, the generally narrow scope of the express liability provisions gives rise to the inference that the restrictions included
are therefore inapplicable to statutory violations outside of the limited
scope of the express sections. The disadvantage of this standard is that
it is too simplistic. By allowing overlap when there is any difference in
substantive requirements, courts may permit plaintiffs to continue to
avoid the express provisions by alleging additional facts which might
be relatively insignificant. Furthermore, this approach ignores the pos170.
171.
172.
proceed

607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2175 (1980).
607 F.2d at 556.
Plaintiffs unable to prove scienter in the filing of misleading documents must therefore
under section 18(a)'s express right of action. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
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sible congressional policy of imposing strenuous procedural restrictions
73
on all private actions involving the same type of statutory violation.
A better standard would require courts to examine the restrictions
imposed on each right of action and assess the likely impact of permitting the implied action on the future use of the express right of action.
Under this standard, overlap would be acceptable in two general situations. First, overlap would be acceptable when, consistent with the
congressional policy embodied in the express provision, each right of
action presented its own distinct procedural or substantive advantages.
Thus, although a class of plaintiffs might be able to sue under either the
express or the implied action, that class could not consistently choose to
bring suit under the latter. For example, a section 10(b) implied right
of action with demanding causation requirements,1 74 but with a long
statute of limitations, could overlap with an express right of action with
liberal causation rules and a short statute of limitations. The policy
underlying the restrictions on each cause of action would be the same:
to prevent the defendant's misconduct from establishing him as an insurer of the enterprise's success. 175 While proceeding under the implied action might allow some plaintiffs to sue who would otherwise be
precluded from bringing suit, other plaintiffs would find it advantageous to bring a timely action under the express provision and avoid
the strenuous causation requirements.
The second situation in which courts would permit overlap would
be when each private action is available only in limited circumstances,
so that a class of plaintiffs would be unable to sue under an implied
private action in order to avoid the restriction included in the express
provision. In Dorfman v. First Boston Corp.,176 a decision involving
section 17(a) 177 and 12(2)178 of the Securities Act of 1933, the court
took a similar approach. In that case, the court found an implied right
173. See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
174. Under the federal securities laws, causation may consist of two separate inquiries: (1) did
the challenged conduct prompt the plaintiff to purchase or sell a security (transaction causation);
and (2) did the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff result from the defendant's wrongdoing (loss
causation). Cox 611. Courts have held that the implied action under section 10(b) imposes permissive causation requirements. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975)
(proof of purchase of shares and of materiality of misrepresentations establishes causational chain
between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs loss to make out prima facie case); Zipkin v. Genesco,
Inc. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,409 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (presumption
of causation). See also Cox 618. The section 10(b) action combination of permissive causation
rules with a long statute of limitations may require reevaluation in light of the Supreme Court's
concern for the statutory scheme. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
175. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
176. 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).

178. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
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of action under provisions of section 17(a) proscribing fraud in the sale
or offering of securities. The court declined to impose the specific procedural requirements of the section 12(2) express right of action, which
permits suit to be brought for innocent or negligent misstatements in
connection with prospectuses and communications. According to the
court, the requirement of proof of fraud in the section 17(a) implied
cause of action distinguished it from the action expressly provided by
section 12. There was therefore "no justification for implying the limi79
tations of § 12" into the implied private action.'
2.

DeterminingSubstantive andProceduralRequirementsfor Im-

plied Private Actions. A second unresolved issue under the limited
overlap approach concerns how courts should determine which restrictions to impose on plaintiffs suing under an implied private action.
(a)

Substantive restrictions. Before deciding which substantive

restrictions to impose, courts first should discern the legislative intent
regarding the elements of the particular implied private right of action.
This approach appears to be required by the Supreme Court's policy
that private rights of action not be implied or expanded unless Congress so intended. 80 However, though Congress may have given con179. 336 F. Supp. at 1095.
180. See notes 18-21 & 50 supra and accompanying text. In this regard, a question arises
whether courts must also reexamine procedural and substantive requirements that have already
been included in implied actions to determine if they are consistent with the perceived legislative
intent. Hachfelder implies that reexamination is required. The court evaluated the section 10(b)
implied private action it had previously recognized in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), to determine if Congress intended to require scienter. 425 U.S. at 19697. A further question is whether courts should eliminate existing implied rights of action if they
are found to be contrary to the Court's interpretation of the likely legislative intent. No lower
court has gone this far. Instead, the courts generally have accepted private actions that they have
previously implied without inquiring into their consistency with the legislative intent. See, e.g.,
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (Supreme Court decisions establishing tests
for implication inapposite when action already has been implied), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2175
(1980); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (Supreme Court's
decisions do not mandate elimination of longstanding private action under section 6 of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. 111.1979) (recognized
implied action should not be subjected to Cari test every time the action is litigated). But cf.
Brotherhood of Ry. Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Philadelphia B. & N.E. Ry. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1308,
1311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (precedent of finding implied action under Railway Labor Act followed
with reservations; action had been inferred before the Cari and Piper decisions).
The Supreme Court is unlikely to eliminate existing implied remedies. For example, it has
distinguished its Borak decision, permitting the implied action under section 14(a) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act to stand. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)
("Since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of
action"). Nonetheless, precedent exists for the Court to eliminate an existing implied remedy: in
Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), the Supreme Court overruled Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), holding that the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ I-
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sideration to the desirable requirements of a possible implied private
action, there may be little direct evidence of legislative intent regarding
the substantive restrictions to be imposed.18 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has indicated that reliable legislative intent regarding an implied

action "may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the stat-

1 82
ute, or in the circumstances of its enactment."
Courts traditionally have discerned legislative intent from three
183
specific sources. They have looked first to the statutory language.
The particular conduct proscribed in the provision giving rise to the

implied private action thus indicates the necessary elements of that acticn. In Dorfman v. FirstBoston Corp.,184 for example, the court found

that fraud was a necessary element of the section 17(a) implied cause of
action in view of the plain language prohibiting fraudulent conduct in
the statute.18-5 When the statutory language inadequately indicates the
underlying intent of Congress, courts have also looked to the legislative
history of the particular statute. 8 6 Despite the frequency with which
this is done, however, courts should avoid placing too much reliance
upon the often equivocal evidence of intent found in the legislative his-

tory. Such evidence may not be conclusive of the general sentiment of
Congress or may be subject to different interpretations; it is, therefore,
an unreliable indicator of congressional intent.' 87 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has demonstrated in its recent decisions that it will rely
on the legislative history to determine the legislative intent. 8 8 Courts
7, 11-15 (1976), no longer serves as the basis of an implied civil action. See H.M. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-806 (2d ed. 1973); Note,
Emerging Standards, supra note 2, at 285. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
181. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (silence in
legislative history regarding implied action not surprising where no express action provided);
Comment, supra note 118, at 1413. Some commentators have criticized as futile the search for
evidence to determine if Congress contemplated resort to private actions without providing for
such actions in the statute. Id. 1412; 61 HARV. L. REV. 858, 860 (1948). Insofar as implication
assumes that Congress did not specifically perceive the need for the implied remedy when it enacted the statute, efforts to discover specific intent to create the remedy are misdirected. Comment, supra note 118, at 1413.
182. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
183. Id. at 16.
184. 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
185. Id. at 1095.
186. A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 97, § 4506 at 322.
187. Comment, supra note 118, at 1414. One court warned: "Courts should avoid delving into
'legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction."' Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Gemsco, Inc. v.
Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945)), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
188. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
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have also looked to the elements of related provisions in the same statute or set of statutes to determine which substantive requirements Congress intended to include in an implied right of action. The theory
behind this analysis is that if Congress worded two statutes similarly or
directed each to the same conduct it is reasonable to infer that Congress
wanted the statutes' implied actions to have the same substantive requirements. 8 9 A prominent example of this reasoning is the section
17(a) 190 implied action, which some courts' 9' have patterned closely after the rule lOb-5 action. 192 In light of the almost identical language of
the two provisions, courts have extended most of the substantive re93 It
quirements of the lOb-5 action to the section 17(a) private action.
thus has been held that the implied action under section 17(a) requires
that the plaintiffs prove scienter. 194 Resort to one or more of these
sources will permit courts to fashion substantive requirements for implied rights of action which comport with the likely legislative intent.
(b) Proceduralrestrictions. When a court is determining what
procedural requirements to impose under an implied private action, littie is gained by searching for evidence of legislative intent. If Congress
did not bother to expressly provide for a private right of action, it is
unlikely to have considered what procedural restrictions would be desirable in the event a court implied a private right of action. Instead,
courts traditionally have looked to state law'9 5 and to the restrictions
contained in related express liability sections 9 6 as guides in formulating the procedural requirements for implied rights of action. While
these may continue to serve as useful models, courts should avoid construing express and implied rights of action inparimateria,whereby all
189.
190.

See A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 97, § 4507 at 323-24.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).

191. See cases cited in note 193 infra.
192.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).

193. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) (section 17(a) requires
scienter); accord,Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. La. 1979). See generaloy Hazen,
supra note 66, at 646-47.

194. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
195. Thus, the courts have applied the analogous limitation period of state law to section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 actions under Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See, e.g., Parrent v.
Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (statute of limitation period for negligence
actions applied to section 10(b) actions); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970)
(two-year state Blue Sky Law limitation applied to state 10(b) action, instead of three-year limitation under general federal fraud law). See Cox 610.
196. See, e.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (procedural restrictions of sections 11 and 12(2) express rights of action applied to portion of section
17(a) implied action not including fraud requirement).
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of the restrictions of the express provisions automatically would be in197
corporated into the implied private action.
3. Preclusion of All Overlap. A final unresolved question is
whether there are situations in which courts cannot use the limited
overlap approach. Arguably, courts may always be able to fashion
some substantive and procedural restrictions for implied private actions
which would preserve the effectiveness of the competing express liability provisions. Hence, some overlap between express and implied actions would always be permissible. The Supreme Court's recent
decisions, however, require courts to disallow overlap when there is evidence that Congress provided the express liability provision as the exclusive remedy for the particular statutory violation. In Reding/on, for
example, the Court found evidence in the legislative history of section
18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act indicating that Congress may have
intended that section to provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements
contained in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 9 8 While the Court in Redington did not decide whether section
18(a) was exclusive, it did indicate that courts should, as a threshold
matter, determine whether Congress intended the express liability provision in question to provide an exclusive remedy. When it can reasonably be inferred that Congress intended an express action to be
exclusive, no overlap should be permitted.
III.

CONCLUSION

Courts attempting to ascertain the proper interrelationship of private rights of action are confronted with a series of Supreme Court
decisions that leave more questions unresolved than answered. Although the courts clearly must adopt an approach that avoids nullifying the effectiveness of express liability provisions included in a federal
statute, the Supreme Court has not indicated the extent to which disruption of the statutory scheme is permissible. The suggested appoach
to harmonization recognizes that some disruption may be acceptable
and permits limited overlap between express and implied private rights
of action. Courts must determine whether those substantive and procedural requirements imposed on plaintiffs suing under the implied cause
of action are sufficient to prevent the nullification of the restrictions
included in the express provision. When the substantive elements of an
implied action have not yet been established or when additional substantive hurdles are necessary to avoid serious disruption of the statu197. See notes 111-114 supra and accompanying text.
198. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979).
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tory scheme, courts should determine the probable intent of the
legislators who enacted the particular statute. This approach is in line
with the Supreme Court's restrictive attitude toward the expansion of
implied rights of action. Finally, the Court's recent decisions also require that lower courts determine whether the express rights of action
in a particular federal act were intended to provide the exclusive remedy for the particular statutory violation. When no clear evidence indicates exclusivity, courts may focus on the likely impact of permitting
overlap upon the statutory scheme.
PatrickB. Fazzone

